

# **ISLAM IN TANZANIA AND KENYA: ALLY OR THREAT IN THE WAR ON TERROR?**

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## **OVERVIEW**

This paper explores the historical emergence of Islam in East Africa, details the political background of Tanzania and Kenya, the role of Islam in each country, and US foreign policy in the region. The recent US strategy of intelligence-sharing with Kenya, training and military support to both Kenya and Tanzania, and air strikes in Somalia are assessed. In addition to the current military emphasis, the US should incorporate more “soft” options, such as the promotion of democratic governance in these nascent democracies through political assistance in constitutional, judicial, and law-enforcement reform, as well as encouraging the inclusion of Muslims in the political system.

## **Introduction**

The US turned its foreign policy focus toward East Africa in the wake of the 1998 Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and increased its interest following the September 11, 2001 attacks on United States soil. Subsequent terrorist actions in Kenya in 2002 led the US to realize that East Africa could potentially become a breeding ground for al Qaeda, and the Horn of Africa has therefore remained a focal point of United States counterterrorism policies as part of President Bush’s stated dual foreign policy goals: the “War on Terror” and the promotion of democracy. Given the continued importance of the Horn of Africa, as well as its continued instability, the upcoming Obama administration will have to maintain a similar focus on the region. Efforts to prevent Islamic extremism there have concentrated on routing out terrorists linked to al Qaeda, as well as backing the Ethiopian military and other peacekeepers in Somalia with the aim of removing Islamic extremists. The US has thus far heavily relied on Kenya as an ally in these efforts, and as such, the country has become of vital strategic importance in the US-led war on terror. However, Kenya is a nascent democracy with pressing internal problems, including widespread poverty, corruption, and tribalism, which indicates a multi-pronged approach is required. In this framework, Tanzania, too, has become highly significant to United States counterterrorism efforts, as Washington seeks to prevent the further diffusion of Islamic-oriented violence, while at the same time bolstering this relatively stable and democratic country.

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Hence, a deeper understanding of the history of Islam along with the internal politics of Kenya and Tanzania are necessary tools for the US to craft an effective policy in the region. In particular, this article traces the historical development of Islam in East Africa and discusses the political background of Kenya and Tanzania. An examination of Islamist extremism in these two states is offered, as well as an assessment of recent US involvement. This begs the question: How successful has the US been in both preventing the development of Islamic extremism and addressing the presence of al Qaeda members? The study concludes with an analysis of the current situation and recommendations for a more comprehensive and effective policy for the region.

### **History of Islam in East Africa**

While Islam itself has been a well-studied discipline, the specifics of Islam in eastern Africa have been only superficially considered. For instance, even such an authoritative source as the *Oxford History of Islam* dedicates to all of Africa just one chapter out of fifteen, and then only discusses Islam in that continent up until 1800.<sup>1</sup> A more comprehensive study of Islamic East Africa is that of J. Spencer Trimingham's *Islam in East Africa*, published in 1964. While an exhaustive study of the region, it is unfortunately over forty years old, culminating in the turbulent period of the independence of many former Western colonies.<sup>2</sup> A very recent and comprehensive study of Islam and Islamic extremism in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda is contained in Jeffrey Haynes' *Islam and Democracy in East Africa*, published in 2006.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, in-depth, scholarly analysis is a rarity, despite the importance of the region to the African continent and US foreign policy.

One area which has received a great deal of attention recently has been the resurgence of religious extremism in Kenya and Tanzania, with specific regards to the already mentioned United States Embassy bombings. The predominantly popular studies made available through the media have focused on the actual terrorist attacks, but have generally not included in-depth analyses of Islam, its history, and its role in local societies.

Today, Islam's greatest influence in Africa can be recognized in three main areas: Western, Central, and Eastern Africa (the latter also known as Nilotic Sudan).<sup>4</sup> In the case of Eastern Africa, which encompasses Kenya and Tanzania, Islamic influences are derived from areas surrounding the Indian Ocean, especially the Arabian Peninsula and—to a lesser extent—the Indian subcontinent. This is mainly due to role of trade, more viable along sea routes than over land to the nearly impenetrable interior.<sup>5</sup>

The Islamic history of Eastern Africa has known three distinct historical periods. The first was the age of the early settlement of Muslims into the coastal areas, eventually subsumed under

Bantu tribal leadership. While little is known of this era, some Bantu locals eventually adopted Islam, mainly in larger urban settings.<sup>6</sup>

The second period, called Shirazi (or Shirazian), involved the establishment of a number of small settlement dynasties along the eastern coast of the continent and on the Comoros Islands, which reached its peak between the 13<sup>th</sup> and the 15<sup>th</sup> Century. The intermarriage of Arab and Persian settlers with local Bantu women led to the creation of a new group of people—the Sawahila (coastalists)—whose language would eventually become the lingua franca for the coast, and much later, for most of Eastern Africa.<sup>7</sup> However, these interactions were entirely localized along the coasts, and little trade or religious conversion took place inland. Indeed, the wealth of the Shirazi, centered on the town of Kilwa, was based on sea trade with Arabia and the Persian Gulf and not with the interior.<sup>8</sup> This period ended with Portuguese colonization of the region.

The third period was characterized by the rise of the island of Zanzibar in modern-day Tanzania and brought about the influence of Hadrami Shafi'i Islam. As Portuguese colonialism in Eastern Africa declined, Hadrami Shafi'i leaders from modern-day Yemen settled there, later to be followed by the Omanis. Beginning in 1813, Sayyid Sa'id ibn Sultan of Oman began establishing control over the islands off the Eastern African coast, such as Lamu and Pate. In 1828, he conquered Mombasa (in modern-day Kenya) and in 1840, finally transferred his entire court from Oman to Zanzibar.<sup>9</sup>

The flourishing of Zanzibar was also an era of significant trade along the Indian Ocean states, and trade, especially in slaves, drove coastal Muslims inward, thus inverting a centuries-old trend.<sup>10</sup> Zanzibar developed into the leading port for the slave trade in Eastern Africa, as well as for spices and other goods, and here Asian merchants—especially immigrants from the Indian subcontinent—would increasingly transfer their capital.<sup>11</sup> As commercial goods required communications and trade links with the interior, new ports were established along the coast as departure points for inland routes leading the Great Lakes region.<sup>12</sup> While the Omani rulers of Zanzibar did not actively seek to spread Islam to the interior, it nevertheless developed among both slaves and some of the inland tribes, especially those most associated with trade.<sup>13</sup>

European re-colonization, this time led by the Germans and then British, inadvertently brought about increased Islamization in the hinterland. German control began in Tanganyika (the non-island portions of the modern-day Tanzania) in 1884 under the German East India Africa Company (*Deutsche-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft*, or DOAG). By 1890, Germans had taken over a ten-mile coastal belt that had belonged to the Zanzibar Sultanate and established control over what would become Tanganyika.<sup>14</sup> European rule and an end to the slave trade led to further opening of the interior to trade, as well as more peaceful conditions. Hence, Tanganyika became a

gateway to the rest of Eastern, and to an extent, Central Africa.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, the diffusion of Islam in Eastern Africa generally followed the establishment of railroads, with the most important Islamic center in the interior being Ujiji on Lake Victoria,<sup>16</sup> and was facilitated by the fact that the Germans initially employed Muslims as officials, police, soldiers, and teachers. Conversions to Islam continued under British colonialism through World War I in what became known as the Mulidi movement<sup>17</sup> but gradually slowed in the 1930s.<sup>18</sup> The third period finally ended with the decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>19</sup>

Of note, the spread of Islam away from the coastal band generally overlaid Islamic traditions on top of existing tribal ones. For example, the belief in one God existed in parallel with traditions of ancestor worship, even though these appear to be contradictory. In these regions, Bantu traditions constitute the underlayer, and Islamic traditions form the superstructure erected upon it. As a consequence, the actual practice of Islam, such as the importance of Sharia (Islamic) law, generally becomes weaker the further one travels into the interior.<sup>20</sup> The coexistence of tribal and Islamic traditions is the primary reason why more fundamentalist visions of Islam, especially the Salafist tradition, have not garnered as much support as in other areas of the Islamic world.

This has not generally been true along the Tanzanian coast and its islands. By the time of German and British colonization, the islands of Tanzania, especially Zanzibar, Lemu, and Pemba, were established Muslim states that looked more to the Arabian Peninsula than to Africa. Indeed, local Arab and Indian practitioners used Islam as a cultural barrier to cut themselves off from —Africans,” meaning those who could not claim Persian, Indian, or Arab descent.<sup>21</sup> In particular, Muslims of Indian descent neither adopted the Swahili culture nor intermarried with Swahilis. Instead, they maintained (and still do) an enclave culture with their own religious festivals, mosques, and so forth. As such, on the coast and islands, Islam and Sharia tended to play a much greater role than in the interior.<sup>22</sup>

After World War I, the British, who had already established relations with the Sultanate of the Zanzibar Islands in the 1880s and then set up a full protectorate in the 1890s, also took over the German colony of Tanganyika. On Zanzibar, and later Tanganyika, the British appointed all the administrative officers, including those associated with Sharia, as well as the local qadi (judges), while differentiating between so-called Arabs, Swahili, and Africans. Arabs were commonly given the most senior posts, followed by Swahilis, and finally, Africans. This arrangement reflected (and exacerbated) preexisting feelings of Arabs looking down on Swahilis and Africans, and Swahilis looking down on Africans. This setting was further highlighted by the adoption of separate mosques for Swahilis and Africans.<sup>23</sup> While many of these prejudices had

preceded the arrival of Europeans, British rule made them more deeply entrenched, and these still largely exist today.

Meanwhile, as an ethnically-fragmented Islam dominated the coasts, in the hinterland, conversions to Christianity were taking place due to the arrival of the first Christian missionaries in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> Century.<sup>24</sup> One result was the establishment of Christian missionary schools, with their modern education standards, which began to assert primacy as the Germans and British established more bureaucratic systems, especially compared to the traditional Islamic madrassas (schools). For instance, by 1929, the Benedictine Catholic order had more than 700 village teachers in southern Tanganyika alone.<sup>25</sup> However, because they were associated with Christianity, these schools were largely shunned by Muslims; many local Muslim elders declared that sending Muslim children to these schools was *haram* (forbidden), and most Muslim children were withdrawn from them.<sup>26</sup> Nonetheless, because Islamic schools were unsuited for the modern nation state and its bureaucratic structures, in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> Century, Muslims gradually declined in socio-economic status in many parts of Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Kenya. These attitudes finally and slowly began to change in the 1950s on the eve of independence.<sup>27</sup>

If Islam in Tanzania mainly grew along trade routes and under colonial rule, however, Kenya was a totally different matter, because it had fewer trade routes from the coast to the interior due to the dangers posed by tribes such as the Masai. As a consequence, commerce remained confined solely to the coastal area, especially near Mombasa, so Islam has been much more confined to coastal regions than one finds in Tanzania.<sup>28</sup> Also, at the time of the country's independence, Kenyan Muslims had been considered by nationalists as too closely linked with non-African influences, namely an Arab-Islamic outlook.<sup>29</sup> However, with independence, the status of Arabs in Kenya gradually changed by virtue of reforms in education and transformations in social and economic outlook of other, now less intransigent, views. In response, Arab Muslim groups sought to preserve their distinctiveness and special privileges from other groups by demanding concessions from the government. Originally, Arab Muslims insisted that the coastal strip around Mombasa should be given autonomy or allowed to return under Zanzibar control. But the African majority, including African Muslims, opposed their claim, and British studies of the issue also recommended that the coastal area remain as part of an independent Kenya.<sup>30</sup> However, guarantees were made to ensure freedom of worship, the preservation of Sharia Law for Muslims, and the retention of Sharia courts.<sup>31</sup>

## **Islamic Sects and Subsects in Tanzania & Kenya**

In the coastal regions, the schools of Islam generally reflect the origin of the particular Islamic population, with Sunni Islam far more predominant than Shi'ism. Most of Eastern Africa is of the Shafi'i school of Sunni Islam, which predominates in the southern portion of the Arabian Peninsula. However, Indians tend to belong to the Hanafi School, preponderant in their country of origin. Overall, the traditional Islamic ruling class has been of Ibadi Islam, which originated in Oman, while one group which has not made substantial inroads, as shall be explained later, has been the Salafist sub-sect of the Hanbali School.<sup>32</sup>

Sufism is another popularly practiced form of Islam found in many areas of Eastern Africa. Sufism is based on a more intimate and personal relationship with God, espousing a connection with Allah that is based more on love than on fear and prohibition. Sufis are organized in brotherhoods, usually centered on a particularly learned or charismatic scholar.<sup>33</sup> The Qadiriya brotherhood is the dominant order, especially in Zanzibar, though in Kilwa, the Shadiliya order predominates.<sup>34</sup> However, even stronger than Sufism is devotion to the Prophet Muhammad, which has been the main focus of worship and features the recitation of his life and virtues at all festivals, to include births, marriages, and so forth.<sup>35</sup>

Given the variety of schools of Islam, disagreements among Sunni groups, surprisingly, generally do not concern the relationship between Islamic law and African customs, since those in the interior generally accepted and assimilated aspects of both. Rather, the conflicts tend to revolve around very minor differences, namely over how religious functions should be conducted. This particular issue, centered over what prayers should be offered on Fridays, developed early in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and has continued since both in Kenya and Tanzania, often leading to intra-community secession movements. In some places, such as Zanzibar, local shaykhs have generally left which prayers are to be offered to personal discretion, but in other areas, these issues are still quite contentious.<sup>36</sup>

One of the leading areas of contention within Eastern African Islam has been that between Sunnis and a sect known as the Ahmadiyya. This sect originally claimed that its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was the Messiah and Mahdi. Its original headquarters was in Pakistan and it engaged in its first missionary activity in Africa in Mombasa in 1934.<sup>37</sup> Though they have won some converts, Ahmadiyya sect members are generally considered heretics among more orthodox Muslims. Tensions rose in the 1930s when the sect first translated the Quran into Swahili, an initiative that was violently attacked by the orthodox for allegations of mistranslation and a slant towards upholding Ahmadi claims. As recently as 2006, the Mufti (senior Islamic cleric) of Zanzibar refused to approve an Ahmadiyya group to travel to Mecca for the pilgrimage because

he considered there to be contradictions between their beliefs and Islam.<sup>38</sup> Likewise, the Ahmadiyya beliefs are occasionally criticized by Kenyan *ulema* in the press. Due to their heretical status, the Ahmadiyya historically have tended to form enclave communities, though in Kenya, they carry out some missionary work among the population.<sup>39</sup>

Another area of contention has been that between mainly Indian Shia Muslims and Sunni Muslims. In many ways, the former have been despised because, following the culturally-based scorn of manual labor shared by many Arabs in Zanzibar and on the coast, the Shia took over lucrative niches of the wholesale trade and became relatively wealthy. Also, they provided capital and loans to Arabs and others, which led to ill will as Arab plantations ran into financial difficulties. On their part, moreover, these Shia are also inward-looking, with differing beliefs from most of the population and a closed class structure which isolates them from the rest of Swahili Muslim life.<sup>40</sup> They do not marry African wives nor do they proselytize to Africans.<sup>41</sup>

The other major Shia sub-sect is that of the Ismailis (also known as —~~Se~~eners” and Nizaris, followers of the Aga Khan). Although small, Ismailis have been among the most highly organized groups.<sup>42</sup> They have traditionally formed very cohesive councils and have assisted one another in establishing businesses, houses, schools, and so forth.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, they were among the first Muslim groups to establish community schools based on 20<sup>th</sup> century educational standards as an alternative to the traditional, madrassa-style, Koranic education noted earlier.<sup>44</sup> Their influence is seen today in such works as the Aga Khan Foundation-run hospital in Dar Es Salaam; economic development projects such as the establishment of insurance companies and factories; the fostering of numerous cultural and historic sites on Zanzibar; and the extensive chain of Serena Hotels, all run by the same Foundation. Hence, the Nizari influence is much greater than its tiny population numbers would suggest.<sup>45</sup>

Aside from the groups noted above, which are common to both Tanzania and Kenya, there are some specific groups resident in Kenya. Most notable are the Somali, who have sought greater autonomy from the Kenyan state since independence, and some have advocated joining the motherland as part of a —~~g~~reater Somalia.”<sup>46</sup> Somalis of the Northeast are tied culturally, tribally, and religiously to Somalia. They number about 600,000 and are Sunni-Shafi’is; their primary language is Somali. At the time of independence, Somalis found the idea of coming under the Kenyan government repugnant, and Somali political parties that aimed at unification with Somalia were banned.<sup>47</sup> Hence, they are still regarded with suspicion by the larger Kenyan state. Indeed, in the 1980s, the government sent a special screening team to Somali areas in order to verify who was a genuine Kenyan citizen versus an —~~li~~en,” with thousands designated as aliens sent back to Somalia. Kenya again tightened its hold on the northeastern regions in the



1990s as the chaos in Somalia resulted in the influx of thousands of refugees, many with weapons, streaming across the border.<sup>48</sup> This area is of extreme interest to the US today. The porous borders enable easy crossing into Kenya, while the remote location and lack of infrastructure and roads allows Islamic extremists to hide. Current US efforts are aimed at apprehending any remaining al Qaeda members who are moving between the two states.

### **The Modern Tanzanian State**

Tanzania has developed a unique state system since mainland Tanganyika gained independence from Great Britain on December 9, 1961. Its leader, Julius Nyerere, like so many newly independent African leaders, sought to create a single, monolithic state, subsuming civil society into corporatist state structures under what was called *Ujamaa* (Swahili for —brotherhood”). This ideology was based upon a combination of Marxism, his observation of the Chinese and other communist systems, and the Bible.<sup>49</sup> *Ujamaa* has been an ambiguous philosophy that generally frowned upon wealth and encouraged living communally and has become synonymous with the African socialism that pervaded post-Independence Africa.<sup>50</sup>

Nyerere had been a schoolteacher, but he gave that up in 1953 to devote himself full-time to the pro-independence Tanganyika Africa Association (TAA), soon to be renamed the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). TANU had formed in response to the grievances of the Mere tribe, who were being forced off their land in the late 1940s to make room for Europeans. In 1958 and 1959, after TANU candidates decisively won legislative elections while running on a pro-independence platform, the British agreed to allow the creation of internal self-governance.<sup>51</sup> In 1962, Nyerere won the first Presidential election, though with allegations of significant intimidation carried out by police on his behalf. In February 1963, he began establishing a one-party state, which was formally enshrined in the Constitution of 1965.<sup>52</sup> The first Five Year Plan for economic development was produced in 1964.<sup>53</sup> Not surprisingly, during the Cold War, Tanzania generally allied itself with the Warsaw Pact or chose Non-Aligned Movement positions.<sup>54</sup>

The Zanzibar Archipelago received its independence in December 1963 and joined Tanganyika in 1964 under the very violent conditions of a coup staged by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). In 1977, the ASP and TANU were combined to create the Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party (Party of the Revolution, known by its acronym CCM), which still rules Tanzania today.<sup>55</sup>

This new state called Tanzania was established by Nyerere in his 1967 Arusha Declaration along the lines of state corporatism. Originally considered a mid-point between capitalism and Marxism, in the corporate state, all interest groups—trade unions, women’s organizations, ethnic organizations, youth organizations, and even religious ones—are directly

controlled by the government. Under Nyerere, these organizations' bureaucracies and their leaders were all employees of the state. As foreign aid was not readily forthcoming, development would have to come from the efforts of the citizens only,<sup>56</sup> a policy that caused substantial economic hardship. As such, the ideas behind state corporatism were that interest groups would still be represented, but a strong government able to guide economic and political development would be firmly in control, at least until such time as the state was prepared for a more —democratic” version of democracy.<sup>57</sup> These state structures, popular in the early and mid-20<sup>th</sup> Century, are now generally considered attempts to disguise authoritarianism.<sup>58</sup>

Nyerere created a single party that was theoretically separate from the state. It was the state which passed down and implemented the many unpopular, and often significantly detrimental, socialist policies of Nyerere, such as the villagization program of the 1970s, in which up to 85 percent of the rural population were forced to leave their home villages to join 7,000 collective rural communities.<sup>59</sup> Meanwhile, the party had the roles of cheerleader and benevolent provider, as if it were somehow separate from the state.<sup>60</sup> The military apparatus was closely tied with both the state and party machines, so that soldiers could be found as ministers and deputy ministers, members of parliament, and party functionaries. This intermixing between military, state, and party functions was likely to ensure no further significant military coups developed like those which threatened the regime in 1968-9.<sup>61</sup>

Popular choices were limited in this system. Rather than holding referendums on contentious issues, a presidential commission would usually be formed to come to a decision, or pronouncements were simply made *a priori* and then popular support would be sought after-the-fact. However, specific issues, such as those pertaining to local roads or schools, might be debated at that level, although under supervision from the central government. Also, local elections occurred for representatives, even if both candidates were always from the same party. Technically, presidential elections were also held, though the ballots only had a —~~es~~” next to a picture of the chosen presidential candidate and a “no” followed by a blank gray square.<sup>62</sup>

Tanzania also had a pervasive security apparatus, much of which apparently remains intact today. The lowest level of security was the expectation that all citizens would act as the eyes and ears of the state. Beyond that, there were cell leaders,<sup>63</sup> party functionaries, district commissioners, regional commissioners, and senior government officials. Intelligence gathering was also a secondary requirement of many non-security related positions. This is in addition to —~~fficial~~” intelligence personnel, including those working undercover amongst their fellow citizens. Nevertheless, the state security apparatus has generally been considered less oppressive

than in other African states, and certainly much less repressive than in the Soviet Union or Maoist China.<sup>64</sup>

In 1985, Nyerere stepped down from office (though he remained an extremely strong —unofficial” voice in the government and society), and Zanzibari Ali Hassan Mwinyi was chosen as the next president. With the fall of Communism in Europe and rising pressure from Western donor nations and institutions, the Tanzanian constitution was changed in 1992 to allow for multi-party elections.<sup>65</sup> This has made Tanzania one of the most democratic states in Africa, although it is hardly a consolidated democracy. In reality, the pervasive party system, from organized neighborhood cells all the way up to the national party, remains intact, so that no other political group has had any practical opportunity to win a majority—perhaps with the exception of the CUF on Zanzibar, which will be explained later. Moreover, many of the current political parties, with the exception of CUF, formed from the ruling CCM party and are believed to be merely fronts from the CCM, with many of their leaders having also been senior members of the state security apparatus in the past.<sup>66</sup>

### **The Modern Kenyan State**

The modern state of Kenya began with the British East African Protectorate in 1895, and was formalized as a British colony in 1920.<sup>67</sup> The British, interested in the fertile central highlands displaced members of the largest tribe, the Kikuyu,<sup>68</sup> and prohibited Africans from direct participation in the government. This sparked the “Mau Mau” insurgency from 1952 to 1959, which led to Kenyan independence in 1963.<sup>69</sup>

Kenya’s first President was a Kikuyu named Jomo Kenyatta. He had been the head of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), assuming power in 1964. The principal opposition party, the Kenya People’s Union (KADU), dissolved and joined KANU in 1966.<sup>70</sup> Although a leftist party, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU), emerged in 1966 under the lead of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenya became a one party state under Kenyatta’s rule. When Kenyatta died in 1978, Vice President Daniel T. Arap Moi, a member of the Kalenjin tribe, replaced him and subsequently ran as the sole KANU candidate in 1979.

As Moi sought to consolidate power by having the National Assembly amend the constitution to ratify the one party state, a failed coup staged by members of the Kenyan Air Force in 1982 left the stability of the regime in question. Members of the plot were arrested and prosecuted, including then Prime Minister Raila Odinga, son of Jaramogi Odinga.<sup>71</sup> Following the coup, Moi cracked down not only on rebel leaders, but also on the opposition within the university community and the critics of the regime’s human rights abuses. Tribal tensions became evident under Moi as a kleptocracy had been established, and the Kikuyu, the largest tribe (22

percent of the population), resented Moi's favoritism to his smaller tribe, the Kalenjin (11 percent).<sup>72</sup>

Throughout the 1980s, Moi maintained power through uncontested elections, corruption, and tight control over the opposition. By 1990, opposition groups and internal tribal unrest led to calls for a multiparty system. Moi continued to reject multipartyism by arguing that it would exacerbate the existing tribal cleavages. In 1991, the National Democratic Party (NDP) under Railia Odinga and the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) formed as opposition parties, although unrecognized by the government. Moi capitulated to a multiparty system in 1992 after Western threats to withhold economic assistance, and the new parties were legalized by constitutional revision. However, tribal violence in Western Kenya in 1992 involving Moi's Kalenjin tribe led to further repression. Moi banned public meetings, which, in turn, led to an opposition strike against the ban, broken up by further violence.

Moi capitalized on the opposition splintering to maintain power through the 1992 and 1997 elections.<sup>73</sup> However, KANU was forced into power sharing in the National Assembly because it secured a slim majority in the legislative balloting. These elections were claimed to be fraught with electoral fraud, which Moi dismissed. A new wave of ethnic violence between Moi's Kalenjin and Rift Valley Kikuyus marred the aftermath of the 1997 elections, leading Moi to dispatch troops to the Western region to quell the violence. The fighting between these groups was to be repeated on a larger scale following the 2007 Presidential elections.

Moi stepped aside in 2002 and Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, was elected the third president of Kenya. Kibaki had served under both the Kenyatta and Moi administrations in senior posts, including Vice President. Internal disputes over proposed constitutional reforms, some of which would have strengthened executive power, ensued in 2003 and culminated in the rejection of the draft constitution in 2005.<sup>74</sup> Railia Odinga, now under the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), played a major role in the defeat of the constitutional referendum.

Simultaneous legislative and presidential balloting was held on December 27, 2007. The legislative balloting went relatively unnoticed as the presidential contest between Kibaki and Odinga took an ugly turn. Widespread criticism of the electoral process, including irregularities in voter tabulation and voter turnout, was targeted at the presidential election. Shortly after the election, the Electoral Commission announced Kibaki the winner. Violence erupted in Kenya, particularly in the West, between Kalenjin and Kikuyu tribes, ultimately leaving 1,700 dead<sup>75</sup> and 300,000 to 600,000 displaced.<sup>76</sup> In late February 2008, President Kibaki and Raila Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement brokered by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, establishing

Odinga as Prime Minister. This fragile coalition remains intact as Kenya attempts to once again address constitutional reform, corruption, and poverty.

### **Islam and Religious Corporatism in Tanzania and Kenya**

In the post-independence one-party states of Tanzania and Kenya (and other African countries), the state forbid political parties based on religion, but instead, established state-run Muslim associations. These associations were tasked to deal with educational, religious, and social matters while acting as a conduit between their constituencies and the government and as a mouthpiece for their respective government policies. In short, they were supposed to control —their” respective Muslims constituencies and any possible subversive tendency that might ensue.<sup>77</sup> However, these organizations were not supposed to get directly involved in politics<sup>78</sup> and they were not necessarily controlled by the *ulema* (senior respected leaders of the Islamic religion). Rather, they were dominated by powerful, and sometimes even quite secular, religious appointees who enjoyed formal positions and salaries from the state. Their goals were not to seek reform of Muslim spiritual behavior, but rather, to control the local Muslim population and ensure their loyalty.<sup>79</sup> In return, these groups would have a degree of access to and the ability to redistribute some of the resources of the state to their constituencies in order to maintain a degree of allegiance and legitimacy. This could be symbolic, such as government leaders participating in religious ceremonies; financial, where the state provides the organization some material benefits; or political, when that group has access to policymakers.<sup>80</sup>

#### *Islamic Corporatism in Tanzania*

The Tanzanian state is officially secular and its constitution guarantees freedom of religion, though at the same time forbidding religious political parties.<sup>81</sup> Unlike in Kenya, Muslims organizations have had an influential role in society and politics since independence. The most important reason for this is that, though the actual percentage of the population that is Muslim is unknown (for the Tanzanian government does not publish these statistics), most reliable sources estimate that the Tanzanians are about 35-40 percent Muslim, 30 percent Christian, and the rest animist or other religions, so that Muslims represent a plurality. They are concentrated on the Zanzibar Archipelago, along the strip of Tanganyika coastline, and along trade routes on the mainland.<sup>82</sup> Given their large numbers and concentrations, they are a difficult population to marginalize.

The pervasiveness of their numbers likely explains why Tanzania, in contrast to Kenya, has also placed Muslims in key positions. The presidency seems to unofficially rotate between Muslims and Christians. Julius Nyerere was the first president, to be succeeded by Muslim Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who served until 1996, followed by another Christian, Benjamin Mkapa.

Today's president is also a Muslim—Jakaya Kikwete. Moreover, the president of Zanzibar is constitutionally a deputy president of Tanzania. Cabinets have also been relatively well balanced between Muslims and Christians.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, as all schools were nationalized, quota systems for all tribal and ethnic groups, including Muslims, were introduced so that Muslims were better represented in secondary schools.<sup>84</sup> This has alleviated some of the educational disparities, and resulting economic ones, between Muslims and Christians.

The Supreme Council of Muslims in Tanzania (known by its Swahili acronym BAKWATA, for *Baraza Kuu Waislamu Watanzania*) was established by Nyerere to represent the state's Muslims. Its mandate was to promote Muslims' interests in legislation, education, and religious affairs. However, as an umbrella organization for all the Muslim groups in Tanzania, it was, unsurprisingly, ineffective at representing the varied interests of the many Muslims there. However, it was effective for the Tanzanian government insofar as it helped control Muslim citizens while also drumming up Muslim support, such as during elections.<sup>85</sup> As such, BAKWATA has only limited legitimacy, further affected by the idea that, as the official mouthpiece of the government, it had been tied to the government's rampant corruption.<sup>86</sup>

Another official Muslim influence group under Nyerere's regime was a council of Muslim elders in Dar Es Salaam. Often, when Nyerere would seek to make an announcement, he would hold a meeting with these Elders, usually broadcast live. This would imply that the Elders had supported whatever decision Nyerere sought, thereby providing that decision legitimacy,<sup>87</sup> but also highlighting Islam's public role in Tanzanian society.

Nevertheless, Tanzanian Muslims, like their counterparts in Kenya, complain of discrimination against them by Christians. Especially for citizens of the Zanzibar Islands, many have felt that their Christian co-nationals treat them as foreigners—as Arabs rather than as Tanzanian citizens.<sup>88</sup> Moreover, economic opening since the 1980s has meant that some groups have benefited more than others, while the proceeds of an increased political openness have been slow to accrue. As such, some of the disappointments and tensions have been channeled into Christian–Muslim violence, as will be documented below.<sup>89</sup>

Because of this, the presence of a government-sponsored Islamic association may have inadvertently fostered some extremist Islam. In fact, this huge umbrella organization cannot possibly represent the interests of so many Islamic groups, and the official BAKWATA has long been recognized as a mere mouthpiece of the government. As a result, marginalized, —unrepresented” Muslims have sought alternative Muslim associations, some of them extremist in nature. For individuals in Tanzania, Islam can act as an ideology of protest against the internal

political and social order.<sup>90</sup> Fortunately, internal splits have also meant that nascent extremists groups themselves tend to split and fall apart.<sup>91</sup>

With the advent of multi-party elections in 1992, more political space has now been created for non-government sponsored organizations of all types—religious, ethnic, racial, and gender-based. Repressed Muslim organizations can take advantage of this political space to express their identity and compete with other groups in the democratic process. However, while relatively more democratic than its neighbors, Tanzania exhibits only the veneer of democracy by Western standards. While more groups may have a voice in the media, their ability to affect the political process remains marginal.

#### *Islamic Corporatism in Kenya*

Islam also plays a unique role in Kenyan law and society. As early as 1895, there has been a triple court system of common courts, native courts, and Islamic Sharia courts, with Sharia courts used for disputes where both parties are Muslim. Today, Sharia courts continue to be used, though they are now restricted to family matters.<sup>92</sup>

Just as in Tanzania, the Kenyan government quickly established pan-Muslim organizations as well. The Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya (SUPKEM) was established in 1973 to consolidate efforts to promote Muslim interests under one umbrella organization, and among its senior officials were Kenyan cabinet officials. In 1979, it was officially recognized as the only organization entitled to represent all Muslims within Kenya and to maintain links with Islamic organizations outside Kenya. Throughout KANU's reign, SUPKEM leaders have emphasized that Muslims must declare their loyalty to the President and his KANU party, and call for keeping religious issues separate from state ones. SUPKEM was organized into district councils, as well as having a women's affairs committee that sent representatives to the annual general meetings. As of 1996, there were 50 district branches and about 150 registered associations and organizations associated with it.<sup>93</sup>

Nevertheless, similar criticisms have been voiced against SUPKEM as have been used against Tanzania's BAKWATA. The organization has been considered corrupt, with allegations that donations have been used for private gain; as such, contributions have declined. Also, given its close ties with KANU, the organization has hardly been considered a neutral arbiter between Muslims and the state. Additionally, SUPKEM has been accused of excessive bureaucracy, rivalry between members, and leadership struggles.<sup>94</sup>

The government also appoints Kenya's chief qadi (judge). The chief qadi is enshrined by the Kenyan constitution to act as the government's advisor on all matters regarding Muslims. As issues such as inheritance, marriage, divorce, and religious endowments are decided for Muslims

under Sharia law, this post is influential indeed. Additionally, the chief qadi appoints local qadis, who are then approved by the president.<sup>95</sup>

In contrast to Tanzania, other Muslim interest groups have existed besides the government-sponsored SUPKEM. In 1968, the National Union of Kenyan Muslims (NUKEM) was established with the stated goal to unify all Muslims in Kenya against some members of the ruling KANU government. Over time, it evolved into to group representing Muslim interests to the government, to fight discrimination against Muslims, and to promote Muslim education and reforms to modernize Muslim society. It has also been seen as a way to check Christian missionary activities in Kenya. NUKEM leaders are seen as close to Arab countries, and have received financial assistance from Saudi Arabia.<sup>96</sup>

Meanwhile, there have been sporadic protests against SUPKEM and official government Islam. For instance, in the mid-1990s, Sheikh Ali Mohammed Shee, the imam of the Jamia Mosque, the central mosque in Nairobi, openly defied some of the chief qadi's decisions, arguing that, as the chief qadi is appointed by the government rather than being appointed by fellow Muslims and as he is not as learned as other Muslim imams, the chief qadi has insufficient Islamic standing for many decisions. Likewise, Shee has argued that SUPKEM's leaders should be more democratic, rather than having its leaders appointed by the government. However, Shee's arguments were hardly universally held by Kenyan Muslims, especially by some Sunni leaders, as Shee is Shia. After violent clashes between the government and some of Shee's supporters, Shee resigned in 1996 (though some argue he was pressured by the police to resign).<sup>97</sup>

However, perhaps the most salient protest to SUPKEM comes from the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK). The IPK was formed in January 1992 just as political parties were being legalized by the Kenyan government in response to international pressure, and it was a main political force in Mombasa in the December 1992 elections. This party has been critical of the government's contention that there can be no religious parties, arguing that existing political parties are all led by Christians. Some members have even demanded the establishment of an independent zone or state along the coast where Muslims would live according to Sharia. From 1992 until 1994, its unofficial leader and spokesman was Khalid Balala, who had returned to Kenya in 1990 from Saudi Arabia espousing a particularly extreme form of Islam. In 1992, clashes between the IPK and the government were particularly violent, with police stations and public buildings attacked and cars set on fire. Several of the demonstrators were then killed or wounded by the police. Demonstrations, strikes, and violence would continue through 1994 in the coastal area, especially Mombasa. The party finally split in 1994 when Balala was expelled due to his increasing extremism, with him even claiming in 1994 that he had ten suicide bombers under his command.



Balala then went to Europe, not to return until 1998, and since has been considered much more moderate.<sup>98</sup>

Though the government has cracked down on more extremist Islamic organizations, it has also become more accommodating to more moderate groups since the violence of the early 1990s, including providing more money for Islamic causes and allowing for more leeway in Islamic education.<sup>99</sup> Nevertheless, the Kenyan government still does not recognize religious political parties, including the IPK.<sup>100</sup>

Also of note, in Kenya, there have been a number of Islamic NGOs, both domestic and foreign. The foreign organizations, in particular, have long histories dating back sometimes to the 1970s.<sup>101</sup> For instance, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have given substantial assistance. This became particularly contentious after five of these NGOs were shut down by the Kenyan government for complicity in the 1998 Embassy bombing.

Nevertheless, the Muslim community in Kenya has been marginalized within the Christian-dominated country, especially compared to the influence of Muslims in Tanzanian politics. The Kenyan government states that 7 percent of the population is Muslim, but Muslim organizations refute this, claiming they are about 20 percent of the population of 25 million. Most sources consider Muslims in Kenya to be about 10-15 percent of the population.<sup>102</sup> They may make up more than 50 percent of the population in coastal towns and cities such as Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu and comprise about 30 percent of the coastal population overall. They are also the majority in northern Kenya where it borders Somalia. Moreover, there are significant Muslim populations in larger towns and cities such as Nairobi, Kisumu, Nakuru, and Eldoret. As such, they are still a political factor that must be taken into account, especially given their predominance in the coastal regions.<sup>103</sup>

Muslims nevertheless argue that, even in areas where they predominate, jobs for those with Muslim names are harder to come by, and that non-Muslims from “upcountry” who are close to the centers of power have been given permission to build hotels, restaurants, and other profitable tourism-related projects and that they get priority for government jobs. They also assert that Christians denigrate the Muslims by claiming they were slave traders who caused harm to black Africans. However, since Kenyan politics is dominated more by ethnic and tribal identity than by religious ones, various Muslim groups tend to be seen in regards to tribal affiliation, rather than explicitly religious affiliation, such as the distinction between Swahili and Somali groups.<sup>104</sup>

Still, Kenyan Muslims have been more politically marginalized than their population numbers would suggest. Under President Kenyatta, Muslims were represented in government

only by two to three assistant ministers out of a total of 40-50 government ministers and assistant ministers. These assistant ministers generally came from a very small circle and served in the same position in successive governments. However, under Daniel Arap Moi's administration, Muslim representation slowly increased such that in 1998, there were 6 Muslim assistant ministers out of 37 and two Muslim ministers. Likewise, after the 1997 parliamentary elections, numbers rose from 24 Muslim members of parliament (12 percent) to 30 out of 210.<sup>105</sup>

Muslims have also become increasingly assertive in lobbying for their interests. In 2005, Muslims attempted to promote their social interests in the proposed constitutional reform effort, including advocating for greater implementation of Sharia law on the coast and in the Northeastern province. They argued that local courts should protect local religious practices and should have the power to rule on issues such as marriage and divorce.<sup>106</sup> However, the reform effort failed in referendum and those powers were not devolved to the local level. At the same time, the Kibaki administration was under attack from Muslim organizations since the extradition of Kenyan nationals to Somalia, Ethiopia, and Guantanamo Bay. Seventeen Kenyan Muslims were subject to rendition by the US under the accusation that they were terrorist suspects.<sup>107</sup>

More recently, the National Muslim Leaders Forum (NAMLEF) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Raila Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) prior to the December 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections. In the agreement, NAMLEF committed to mobilizing support for Odinga's presidential bid in exchange for infrastructure and education support in marginalized areas. Odinga was probably attempting to gain political support and promote the rift between the Muslim community and President Kibaki with this agreement. Interestingly, SUPKEM denounced the pact because the Council had not been consulted and because it did not benefit all Kenyan Muslims, but rather, just those concentrated on the coast and in the northeast. The pact was rejected by all parties following the ensuing controversy on the grounds that it incited religious animosity.

Currently, Muslim organizations are exercising greater power than they have since independence. In the aftermath of the 2007 post-election crisis, Muslim representation in the Kenyan parliament is now at its highest levels ever: 32 seats in the 222-member parliament. As such, Muslims are feeling more politically empowered.<sup>108</sup> As Kenya hopefully progresses in its democratic consolidation, the expectation is that Muslim organizations and their underlying constituencies will be further incorporated.

## Islamic Violence and Extremism in Kenya and Tanzania

Historically, Islamic extremism has been relatively rare in Eastern Africa.<sup>109</sup> Theoretically, low-capacity and vastly corrupt government institutions, extremely high levels of poverty (50 percent of Kenyans and 36 percent of Tanzanians live below the poverty line), inadequately guarded borders, and nearby troubled neighbors (such as Sudan and Somalia) should make Kenya and Tanzania the ideal recruitment grounds for terrorists.<sup>110</sup> Additionally, heavy coastal trade and a culture of smuggling would provide excellent logistical cover.<sup>111</sup>

However, the primary reason for poor recruitment in the area is found in the presence of a number of Sufi Muslims and in local Islamic tradition being infused with tribal customs and beliefs. Islamic fundamentalists, especially the puritanical Salafists, consider local forms of Islam to be “primitive” and in need of being “purified.”<sup>112</sup> This criticism of locals’ faith and practices has not endeared Salafists to many local Muslims. Also, the extremists are politically and socially marginalized both in Tanzania and Kenya, with little evidence that the Muslim populations at large are willing to take up arms against “the West,” or even to seek the establishment of an Islamic state. Finally, from a cultural point of view, Islamic groups have relied on discussion and negotiation throughout their histories, not violence.<sup>113</sup> In short, the jihadist message simply has not widely resonated with the local populations there. Although al Qaeda may have garnered some local recruits, with perhaps 10 to 15 “ sleeper cells ” in Kenya alone, their numbers remain relatively small.<sup>114</sup>

Terrorist attacks associated with Islamic extremism have generally been credited to non-Africans who arrived there for that specific purpose. These foreign fighters have utilized Africa’s weak rule of law and poor governance to gain the level of sanctuary required to operate. Moreover, relatively cosmopolitan cities with large Muslim populations have allowed foreigners to enter and set up their cells without arousing suspicion from security forces. While there have been a few locals involved in terrorist attacks, they have generally played a marginal role.

### *US Embassy Bombings of 1998 and Subsequent Terrorist Attacks*

The most well known incident in regards to Islamist extremism in the region was that of the August 7, 1998 bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi (codenamed Operation Kaaba by al Qaeda) and Dar Es Salaam (codenamed Operation Al Aqsa).<sup>115</sup> In this case, the perpetrators were predominantly foreigners who may have taken advantage of pre-existing religious tensions to obtain cooperation from some locals.

The dual Embassy bombings took five years from inception to attack, with initial planning beginning in 1993. In 1995, a Palestinian al Qaeda member from Jordan, Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, moved from Pakistan to Mombasa and set up a fishing business. The business

provided a cover to explain the odd hours and shipments coming and going, as well as providing a discreet logistical capability. He also went so far as to marry a local Kenyan woman. Usama bin Laden also sent his then-number two, Abu Ubaydah Al Banshiri, a former Egyptian policeman, but he drowned in 1996 in a ferry accident on Lake Victoria. To replace him, Mohammed Abdullah Fazul of the Comoros Islands was dispatched from Pakistan, along with Wadih Al Hage, a senior al Qaeda financier (who was later captured by the US). The two suicide bombers responsible for the Nairobi operation were Saudis.<sup>116</sup>

However, there were local assistants as well. In Kenya, one was Ali Salim, a mechanic who is believed to have loaned his garage to use for preparation of the bomb. Another was James Nganga, who managed a lodge in Nairobi where the bomb may have been assembled.<sup>117</sup> Nevertheless, this was primarily a foreign operation.

In the Dar Es Salaam operation, again, most of the conspirators were foreigners. However, one Tanzanian was Khalfan Khamis Mohammed (who was taken into US custody). Mohammed was born on one of Tanzania's islands and had later moved to Dar Es Salaam before saving enough money to travel to Afghanistan in order to train for jihad. In 1995, he, too, was sent to Tanzania to open a fishing business, regularly travelling along the coast of Kenya and Somalia. He has claimed his duties were limited to arranging transportation of bomb components and finding a house in which to build the device. The Dar Es Salaam bomb was built by the same Egyptian technician as the Nairobi one, and it was driven to the target by another Egyptian.<sup>118</sup>

In November 2002, two more al Qaeda-associated attacks occurred in Mombasa, Kenya when terrorists fired a surface-to-air missile against an Israeli airliner, which missed, and a suicide bombing hit a nearby resort popular with Israeli tourists, killing 15. The message from these attacks appears to be two-fold. First, it drew the Israelis into a war with al Qaeda. Second, by almost downing an airliner, it put the entire aviation industry on even higher alert.<sup>119</sup>

Remnants of the Embassy bombings cell are believed to have conducted this operation under the leadership of Mohammed Abdullah Fazul, the Comoros Islands-born mastermind of the 1998 attacks. Apparently, he had been living in the Kenyan town of Lamu under the alias Abdul Karim, teaching at a madrassa, and marrying a local woman. In keeping with the fishing tradition, he had established lobster fishing business as a cover. Meticulous planning was undertaken, including a meeting in Mogadishu, Somalia, and a number of boats were stashed for a post-attack escape back to Somalia.<sup>120</sup>

There exist several reasons why al Qaeda may have chosen this region to conduct large-scale terrorist attacks. Mainly, it provided access to Somalia as well as lines of communication, such as the routes used to smuggle goods and people via sea or by land across the porous borders

of Somalia and from al Qaeda's home, then located in Sudan.<sup>121</sup> Moreover, the large Muslim communities made it relatively easy for al Qaeda members to hide, even for years if necessary. Finally, the region has been notorious for poor law enforcement, making smuggling and other illegalities easier to accomplish.<sup>122</sup>

### *Tanzania*

While the al Qaeda attacks noted above have gained the most notoriety, they are not the only occurrences of Islamic violence in the region. One of the earliest concerns about rising extremism was expressed by the British in Kenya in October 1917. Colonial authorities reported that throughout —German East Africa” (Tanganyika) there was a developing political movement aimed at embracing a pan-African view of Islam. The British were concerned about an —African Jihad,” where African Islamic forces might unite against Europeans.<sup>123</sup> Concerns about more fundamentalist forms of Islam continued to be an issue for the British Crown in the 1920s and 1930s, with many reports of clashes between those who continued to fuse Bantu traditions with Islam and those who appealed only to the Koran as the central authority in religion.<sup>124</sup>

Known incidents of Islamic extremism in modern-day Tanzania are relatively rare, though this could be due to government censorship and may not necessarily reflect reality and popular opinions. However, besides tensions between the government and Zanzibar Muslims (described later on in this paper), there have been some incidents on the mainland as well.

Tensions first rose in the 1990s, to a large extent as a result of government policies. In 1992, the government announced that, in order to reduce public spending, the country's health and education systems would be transferred to the Catholic Church. A fundamentalist group, the Council for the Promotion of the Koran in Tanzania (known by its Swahili acronym BALUKTA for *Baraza la Uendelezaji wa Kuran Tanzania*) was at the forefront of protests over this decision. BALUKTA had been formed in opposition to BAKWATA, which BALUKTA accused of being a government sell-out to the Christians. In March 1992, BALUKTA occupied the headquarters of its government-sponsored rival, until ousted by a government order. Its leader, Shaykh Yahya Hussein, then began to use fiery rhetoric during his sermons at Dar Es Salaam's central mosque.<sup>125</sup> In April 1993, his group staged demonstrations, destroyed some butcher shops owned by Christians that sold pork, and attacked some bars. Shaykh Yahya Hussein was arrested, as were about forty of his followers, and accused of trying to overthrow the regime and establish a Sharia state.<sup>126</sup> He eventually moved to Swaziland, while another of BALUTKA's leaders, Shaykh Kassim Bin Jumaa, was in and out of police custody until he died in January 1994 of his —blood pressure” (a diagnosis that obviously brought some to suspect foul play by the

government).<sup>127</sup> BALUKTA was banned, although attempts were apparently made to re-integrate at least some of its members into BAKWATA.<sup>128</sup>

In 1998, a group called the *Khidmat Da'wat Islamiyya* (the Service for Islamic Propagation) rioted during prayers in Dar Es Salaam and shouted anti-Christian slogans. During the ensuing clashes, several protesters were shot dead and more than 100 were arrested. Claims were made that foreigners from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, and Sudan were responsible for the riot, and Sudanese nationals living in Dar Es Salaam, including some teachers, were expelled from the country.<sup>129</sup>

Most recently, there were reports of some demonstrations against the US bombing of Afghanistan in late 2001 and in support of Usama bin Laden,<sup>130</sup> although his popularity as a hero does not necessarily translate into support for Bin Laden's ideology.<sup>131</sup>

More troubling has been the activity of Shaykh Ponda Issa Ponda and his "overt organization" known as Simba wa Mungu (God's Lion), linked to the 1999 storming of the Mwembechai Mosque in Dar Es Salaam in which four Muslims were killed. In February 2002, Shaykh Ponda and his group were accused of inciting attacks against foreigners and "morally corrupt" Muslims, conducting armed takeovers of some moderate mosques in Dar Es Salaam, and the firebombing of a tourist bar in Zanzibar's Stone Town.<sup>132</sup> Moreover, against the wishes of the normal congregation of the Mwembechai Mosque, the so-called "Ponda Coup" had undertaken a demonstration and "special prayers." On that occasion, the police had to use tear gas and live ammunition in order to disperse the protestors, with 2 dead (one policeman and one civilian) and 53 arrested. Eight of the arrestees, to include Shaykh Ponda and Shaykh Mussa Kanducha, were charged in the killing of the police officer, but they were later released and the charges dropped. Ponda, however, was again in jail in 2003 on charges that he was seeking to forge subversive ties with likeminded extremists in Kenya and Burundi.<sup>133</sup>

#### *Modern Conflicts between Zanzibar and the Mainland*

While extremism has been a concern in Tanganyika, the sporadic outbursts of violence (with the exception of the 1998 US Embassy bombing) generally pale in comparison to the recurrent clashes between Muslims and Tanzanian government forces on the Zanzibar Islands. When Tanganyika received its independence from the British, the island of Zanzibar had an Arab aristocracy dominating the Shirazi minority. At that time, Africans represented 77 percent of the population,<sup>134</sup> Shirazi 6 percent, and Arabs 17 percent, but the latter monopolized the decision making process and owned the large agricultural plantations constituting one of the mainstays of the economy.<sup>135</sup>

Electoral tensions and violence have existed on the Zanzibar Archipelago since the first elections were held while still a British colony in July 1957. In the first election, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), a radical leftist party representing African residents of Zanzibar, won no seats against parties presenting more pro-Arab, pro-Swahili, and pro-British interests. However, the January 1961 elections were a draw and were re-held six months later. After that vote, several parties formed a coalition against the ASP, which had earned only 10 out of the 26 available seats due to complicated electoral rules (it had in fact won 49.9 percent of the overall ballots). The result was widespread rioting with Arabs, and later the native population, due to allegations of intimidation and double voting. When the islands received their independence from the British in December 1963, they were governed by this coalition government.<sup>136</sup>

A month later, a Ugandan immigrant named John Okello led a violent coup against the government and the Sultanate, toppling both. Much of Zanzibar's Arab population was either massacred or expelled, and a Zanzibar Revolutionary Council was established composed of ASP members led by Abeid Karume.<sup>137</sup> Nyerere then signed an act of union with Karume in April 1964 creating modern Tanzania—a move not necessarily popular with much of the Zanzibar Archipelago's population.<sup>138</sup>

In 1972, Karume was assassinated and replaced by Aboud Jumbe. This spurred the Tanzanian government to deepen its consolidation of the state, and the TANU and ASP parties were combined into the ruling CCM. In April 1977, a new constitution was ratified that further solidified CCM rule and Tanzania remained a single-party state until 1992.<sup>139</sup>

Tensions, albeit in non-violent form, occurred again in 1992 when Zanzibar announced it was joining the Organization of Islamic States (OIC), of which the government of Tanzania is not a member. This caused an uproar in the Tanzanian media and parliament which forced the Zanzibar government to retract its membership application.<sup>140</sup>

When multi-party elections were legalized in 1992, the Civic United Front (CUF), led by Seif Shariff Hamad, was organized on the Zanzibar Archipelago. The CUF is headquartered on the Islamically conservative island of Pemba, and one of its party platforms has been to raise the issue of separation from mainland Tanzania, a move looked upon unfavorably by the ruling CCM. The CUF has been the main electoral competition to the CCM since then.<sup>141</sup>

Since the first multi-party elections in 1995, violence has been endemic to the political cycle. In 1995, the CCM's candidate, Salmin Amour, was declared the winner with 50.2 percent of the vote, but the elections were considered neither free nor fair and clear evidence of ballot stuffing was found.<sup>142</sup> As a result, foreign development assistance was suspended and most

expatriates working on the islands left.<sup>143</sup> Tensions remained, and in 1997, a Catholic church on Zanzibar was destroyed in an explosion.<sup>144</sup>

The 2000 elections on the Zanzibar Archipelago were again close, but the CCM candidate, Amani Abeid Karume, the son of the first post-coup government, was declared the winner. As a result, in January 2001, the CUF called for demonstrations. On the island of Pemba, the police responded to these demonstrations with force, and Human Rights Watch reported at least 35 dead, 600 wounded, and widespread shootings, beatings, and sexual abuse.<sup>145</sup> As a result of this violence, the CUF and CCM initiated a dialogue aimed at ending the long-standing crisis which was concluded in 2001, but tensions remained.<sup>146</sup>

Elections were held again in December 2005.<sup>147</sup> Though considered less unfair than previous ones, there were still allegations of double registration and registration of non-citizens and non-Zanzibari soldiers in order to shift numbers against the opposition, as well as the suspicion that opposition members were deliberately left off voter rolls. In this setting, violence broke out over CUF being forbidden from using Zanzibar facilities for a rally (as CCM had previously done), culminating in pre-election clashes with 19 injured.<sup>148</sup> The voting itself was generally considered fair, though with significant concerns over the collation and counting processes,<sup>149</sup> but no reports of violence anywhere approaching the scale of that witnessed in 2000. In the end, Karume was again declared the winner in a close-run duel, with the next election scheduled to take place in 2010.

These historical and cultural tensions, along with the fact that the Zanzibar islands have not seen the same economic growth and social development as the mainland, have made the British and US governments concerned about the possibility of Salafist influences from Saudi Arabia or Sudan. Today, well-funded and logistically prepared extremists can easily infiltrate the islands, while Saudi Arabia is reported to contribute as much as \$1 million per year to build new mosques, madrassas, and Islamic centers throughout the country.<sup>150</sup> Moreover, two al Qaeda operatives have come from the Zanzibar: Khalfan Khamis Muhammad, who was associated with the Embassy bombing, and Qaed Sanyan al-Harithi, who was killed in 2002 in Yemen. There are concerns that the heavy tourist traffic in the region could provide lucrative targets,<sup>151</sup> and as such, Zanzibar will remain a primary east African concern for counterterrorism forces.

### *Kenya*

Kenya, too, has been marred by Islamist violence beyond that of the Embassy bombing. One of the earliest episodes occurred in Kenya in November 1987, when five imams from Tanzania were expelled from the country for reasons that remain obscure. No explanation for how they left Tanzania or why they came to Kenya is available. The Christians claim the five



clerics were expelled because they slandered the Bible; the imams rebut that the expulsions followed their success in converting Christians to Islam, including a priest. In response to the expulsion, a Kenyan Muslim assistant minister and the Mayor of Mombasa were assaulted during a holy day procession, and during a violent demonstration by about 4,000 Muslims, cars and government property were damaged. About 100 were arrested, though some of these arrests appeared to be personal vendettas for the assault on the minister.<sup>152</sup>

Tensions also grew around the Tabligh Movement, which came to Kenya from Pakistan in 1990 and established branches in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Malindi. This puritanical movement only numbered about 20 to 30 members, but was quite visible due to their physical appearance, with men wearing long beards and long gowns while always carrying prayer beads, while the women wore full robes and veils in a style far more modest than local Islamic dress. In particular, some young men were attracted to the movement because it offered financial assistance to those willing to study the Koran full-time. Some Tabligh members were arrested in 1994 after setting fire to some tourist bars. However, generally, Tablighi members avoid confrontation with authorities.<sup>153</sup>

As noted above, tensions continued to grow with the emergence of multi-party elections and the desire by the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) to be recognized as a legitimate party. These led to significant bouts of violence along the coast in 1992 through 1994, and may have been what initially encouraged Al Qaeda to consider Kenya as a location in which to conduct operations on the Horn of Africa.

Despite the more recent terrorist attacks in 1998 and 2002, Islamic extremism remains low in Kenya.<sup>154</sup> It continues to be an unappealing religious ideology amongst the moderate Kenyan Muslims, and there is little evidence that radicalism has gained any new support. Since the initiation of multi-party elections, Muslims have gained a greater voice in the electoral system. Their vote has become more important, particularly in two provinces, with the help of a change in electoral rules that now stipulate that presidential candidates receive 25 percent of the vote in 5 out of 8 provinces. The hope is that Muslims will be further incorporated into the political system assuming democratic consolidation continues. Therefore, the threat of Islamic extremism in the region seems to primarily concentrate within Kenya's neighbor Somalia.

#### **US Anti-terrorism Policy in the Horn of Africa**

Since the November 2002 simultaneous attacks in Mombasa, US efforts have been directed at apprehending a handful of suspected al-Qaeda leaders, particularly Fazul Abdullah Mohammed. In October 2002, the United States established the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti, which consists of 1,800 troops.<sup>155</sup> This has provided a base of

operations for coastal patrols and access to northeastern Kenya in order to monitor the porous border with Somalia.

Also since 2002, Kenyan and US military units have held bilateral military exercises along the Kenyan coast. These exercises, called —Edged Mallet,” have involved the exchange of tactical knowledge between US Marines and Kenyan forces.<sup>156</sup> More recently, cooperation has continued and has been extended to exercises involving small arms training, reconnaissance, and joint sea patrols. In 2006, the US donated six armored speedboats to patrol the coast at the cost of \$3 million.<sup>157</sup>

In addition to receiving increased military aid, Kenya has worked closely with the US on intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism training. A series of initiatives were launched following the 1998 bombings, including the National Security Intelligence Service that has trained Kenyan police. Throughout 2003 and 2004, the Kenyan government established the Anti-Terrorist Police Unit, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the National Counter-Terrorism Center, and the National Security Advisory Committee.<sup>158</sup> These counterterrorism initiatives were sponsored by the United States-backed East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI). Finally, Kenya has increased its airport security through the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP).

In addition to these formal initiatives and training, the US has put pressure on Kenya to enact anti-terrorism legislation, often with significant blowback from the Kenyan public. In 2003, the Kibaki government introduced the —Suppression of Terrorism Bill,”<sup>159</sup> but public outcry of this bill forced its withdrawal. Kenyan reactions to this kind of legislation, as well as complaints of human rights violations against the Anti-Terrorist Police Unit, have led Kenyans to question its close association with the US. A new bill with greater civil rights protections was introduced in 2005,<sup>160</sup> but the bill was rejected as Kenya faced internal political turmoil due to failure of its Constitutional reform referendum and subsequent riots.

Other popular resistance to United States-promoted legislation includes US strong-arm tactics to get Kenya to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) that protect Americans from prosecution in the International Criminal Court (ICC).<sup>161</sup> The US initially tied aid to the signature of BIAs, and when Kenya refused to sign, it lost US aid in both 2005 and 2006. The United States government has since reconsidered and aid has resumed, but Kenyans were left with a strong dislike of these tactics, especially in light of Nairobi’s consistent cooperation in the War on Terror. Thus, public outcry and widespread governmental and judicial corruption make it less likely that legislation will be passed in the near future. The current frail coalition government has set their priorities at keeping peace and stability in the country, and not on counterterrorism legislation.

Kenya is also critical of the travel warnings posted by the United States State Department since 2002.<sup>162</sup> Kenya's economy depends heavily on tourism to the Masai Mara safari area as the country's biggest influx of foreign capital. These travel warnings were just lifted in August 2008, but the economic damage had been done. From 2002 to 2003, the Kenya Tourist Federation (KTF) reported a 28 percent drop in American tourism, though this drop is likely not entirely due to the travel advisory (the 2002 attacks in Mombasa and the war in Iraq have likely also had an impact). The State Department subsequently softened the wording of the travel advisory and tourism rebounded until late 2007. The disputed elections in December 2007 and the months of violence which followed resulted in another steep decline in tourism. *The Economist* reports the country lost \$191 million in revenues in the first half of 2008, with visitors down 36 percent to 561,000 compared with the first six months of 2007. Rightly or not, in the last five years, Kenyans have associated the travel warnings with the anti-terrorism legislation. They have argued they have been wrongly punished for terrorist incidents and are being unduly pressured to comply with US security demands.

Indeed, US interests and actions in Kenya are directly linked to events in neighboring Somalia, rather than to a perceived Islamic threat within that country. Kenya's Somali population in the Northeastern province and permeable border makes Nairobi's cooperation critical to the US. Somalia has been a failed state ruled by warlord fiefdoms since long-time dictator Mohammed Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991. In June 2006, the Islamic Courts (ICU) took control of Mogadishu and areas of southern Somalia from warlords. The ICU, comprised of different clan-based courts, first appeared in 1994 south and west of the capital Mogadishu and operated as a judiciary by arresting, prosecuting, and punishing criminals, filling the vacuum left by the lack of a Somali central government. The US worried that the Courts, as well as al Qaeda-linked individuals in Somalia, would establish a Taliban-like regime in the failed state.

Initially, the 2006 takeover of the capital Mogadishu consisted of moderate Islamists, and citizens appeared generally relieved that the ICU would impose order in Somalia. However, the Courts began to enforce "Islamic" restrictions on the population and popular support began to wane. ICU leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys has denied extremism or links to al-Qaeda, but the international community has remained wary.<sup>163</sup>

Meanwhile, the international community supported the interim transitional government formed in 2004 and located in Baidoa in the west of the country,<sup>164</sup> but the Somalis have accused the US of trying to set up a puppet government and that the United States Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) channeled funds through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to Ethiopian secret services.<sup>165</sup> By November 2006, Ethiopian forces had moved

into Baidoa, and within weeks, the ICU had lost control of Mogadishu. US military strikes quickly followed in January 2007, targeting Islamists Abu Talha al Sudani, who is tied to the 2002 missile attacks, and Fazul Abdullah Mohammed.<sup>166</sup> To date, the US has launched five air strikes on Somalia targeting al Qaeda-linked terrorists; however, Mr. Fazul has thus far eluded capture by escaping across the Somali-Kenyan border.

It appears that the US has enjoyed some degree of success in capturing or killing a few al Qaeda members in the region, but the situation remains precarious. The transitional government is still weak, and the ICU continues to act as an insurgent and terrorist organization within Somalia. *The Economist* reports that *Al Shabaab*, a follow-on group to the ICU that has been allied with al Qaeda and designated as a terrorist group by the United States Government, is sheltering al Qaeda member Saleh Ali Nabhan, who is now calling for a holy war in Somalia.<sup>167</sup> In addition to further radicalization and ongoing fighting, Somalia faces a devastating humanitarian crisis. As of September 2008, —3 million Somalis (out of 8 million) now need aid to stay alive: a 77 percent rise on last year. A sixth of Somali infants are at risk of starving to death.”<sup>168</sup>

US concerns over Somalia will only continue to increase. In early 2009, Ethiopia began withdrawing its forces after two years there, to be replaced by 3,400 Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers from the African Union, which could lead to a power vacuum despite a peace deal signed between Somalia’s transitional governments and some of the opposition factions, especially given the recent resignation of transitional President Abdullahi Yusuf.<sup>169</sup> Meanwhile, piracy of international shipping continues as a possible means for Islamist groups to garner resources. Moreover, the threat has recently hit close to home, as the FBI and Somali immigrant communities in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area fear up to 20 young men have disappeared and are believed to have travelled to Somalia to assist Islamist rebels there. Additionally, a Somali-American may have been a suicide bomber there on October 28, 2008.<sup>170</sup> All of this indicates that the Horn of Africa will remain as important to US policy under the Obama administration as it has been under the Bush one.

Tanzania has also been at the forefront of counterterrorism efforts, albeit not to the same extent as Kenya and Somalia. It has signed the various anti-money laundering and counterterrorism treaties and pieces of legislation, as well as agreeing to various information sharing agreements with its neighbors and the US. However, Tanzanian police do not have the capacity to uproot most money laundering and terrorism financing, and their ability to counter terrorism overall is questionable.<sup>171</sup> Given the myriad of problems, especially poverty, in Tanzania, terrorism will remain a low priority for its government. And even should the order of

priorities change, the low (if growing) capacity and credibility of local police and judicial forces among the citizenry would only allow for a limited government response.<sup>172</sup>

### **Conclusions and Policy Recommendations**

In regards to concerns over Islam in Tanzania and Kenya, the world has clearly focused on the 1998 US Embassy bombings and the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, Kenya. However, as illustrated above, there exists a much more varied and complex history of Islam in the region, far beyond the few spectacular actions mainly carried out by outsiders. An understanding of the history of Islam, as well as cultural and tribal relations, is necessary to implement a long-term effective foreign policy in the region. A more nuanced and multifaceted approach that results in further democratic consolidation for the countries considered in this study, thus going beyond plain military and counterterrorism aid, is key to minimizing Islamic extremism. On an immediate level, anti-terrorism assistance should continue. Both countries have relatively low levels of state capacity in any form, including counterterrorism, and bolstering their governments by fostering more professional security forces can improve the situation. However, a greater emphasis on building overall state capacity in regards to law enforcement, the judiciary, and the economy will yield far better long-term results.

Some of this is already occurring, particularly within the Department of Defense (DoD). For instance, while the US Departments of State and Treasury have always taken a more comprehensive role, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Africa Theresa Whelan has argued that there has been a paradigm shift in how the DoD sees threats in Africa, and as such, is now focusing not only on building capacity and specific counterterrorism measures, but also on alleviating the conditions that could lead to recruitment by extremist groups.<sup>173</sup> Indeed, the US's new Africa Command (AFRICOM) was created for just this purpose.

In Kenya, US policy and aid has been focused on the military and specific police counterterrorism units, though the country has severe internal issues, such as corruption, crime, tribalism, and widespread poverty. The December 2007 elections and subsequent ethnic violence demonstrates the fragility of the government. Kenya has been a cooperative ally in fighting terrorism, to some extent against its best interests. As the country struggles to establish and consolidate its democracy, the US should encourage constitutional reform, address basic infrastructure problems such as the lack of usable roads, encourage border controls, and construct a comprehensive economic aid program, rather than focusing so strongly on specific counterterrorism issues. As such, it is in the US's best interest to ensure that Kenya remains stable and economically functioning, for instance by encouraging tourism, so as to boost its economic growth.

Also, United States aid must address endemic corruption and poor judicial functioning, or specific US counterterrorism aid will be of little utility. For example, United States military aid has been used to train the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, but Kenya's widespread corruption has translated into low levels of trust for Kenyan police forces and recurring instances of mob justice instead. The arrest of suspected terrorists by a well-trained component of the police does little good if they are then allowed to enter a corrupt and useless judiciary. Moreover, because trust in the government is so low, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit has been accused by Kenyan Muslims of unfairly targeting them and of committing human rights violations. Hence, the US should provide training to police forces, as well as security forces, while encouraging judicial reform.

In addition, the US should not be too heavy-handed in its counterterrorism tactics in Kenya. The country takes a risk in its close association with the US and actions that violate Nairobi's sovereignty, such as the rendition of 17 Kenyan nationals, cause Kenyans to question its relationship with the US. The US needs to be more sensitive to Kenya's internal issues.

Meanwhile, in Somalia, the US has been keen to establish a stable, functioning government. The current humanitarian crisis and recent pronouncements by *Al Shabaab* that it will join al Qaeda in a jihad against the West do not bode well. To further complicate matters, the hunt for a handful of al Qaeda members has exacerbated the conditions that breed terrorist recruitment. The Somali people desperately need humanitarian aid or a third of the population could face starvation. The weak transitional Somali government has requested 8,000 troops to replace the African Union and Ethiopian forces.<sup>174</sup> The US should continue to fund military peacekeepers in Somalia in order to at least keep it less unstable in the short term. Additionally, US airstrikes must be carefully weighed against the prospect of increased instability there, and perhaps even additional popular support for hard-core Islamist elements. Further peace negotiations between factions within Somalia and the transitional government are also in the best interest of both the US and the Somali people.

In the case of Tanzania, the future, while certainly not bleak, does hold some concerns. On the one hand, though Tanzania is far from a consolidated democracy, its record demonstrates that the country is more open and democratic than at any other time in its history. This is problematic insofar as groups that were formally restrained now have the means to organize and proselytize. As moderate voices have long been co-opted within the corporatist Tanzanian state, more radical voices are likely to emerge and some may even advocate violence. Given the history of tensions in the region, most notably in the Zanzibar Archipelago and, to a lesser extent, in Tanganyika, a particularly charismatic (and perhaps well resourced) extremist Islamist leader might be able to carve the political space in which to organize a campaign of violence. Moreover,

given the uneven economic development taking place, some groups are clearly —winners” in this new system while others are —losers,” which naturally leads to increased disgruntlement and the renewal of old animosities.

Exacerbating this is the official state myth of a nationalist Tanzania united in brotherhood, so that there is no discourse among Tanzanians about the good and bad of the Nyerere era or the years before it. Discussions by one of the authors with Tanzanians and expatriate scholars, as well as non-Tanzanian sources, indicate that there is a long memory of grievance about the rule of Nyerere, and even all the way back to the slave trade of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries. Nyerere worked hard to try to unify Tanzanians with a sense of nationalism, to institute the common language of Swahili across the country, and to incorporate all groups in the government—all of which has clearly born some fruit. Unlike all of its neighbors, with the exception of the Zanzibar Archipelago, widespread violence is rare, and what exists is certainly nowhere near the scale of that recently exhibited in Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, or Burundi. Indeed, Tanzania has been sheltering refugees from all of these conflicts for decades. If this sense of nationalism remains, if democracy consolidates, and the rule of law gains a better foothold and replaces the current authoritarian tendencies, then the country could grasp an opportunity to bring in new voices with a real stake in the system. A peaceful handover of power from one party to another, along with better quality law enforcement, could empower non-violent Islamist voices. At the same time, better law enforcement would mean that investigating and arresting those who eschew the democratic process for terrorism or other political violence could be effective. This could also act as a beacon for other eastern and southern African states, as they, too, seek to evolve into consolidated, liberal democracies.

Hence, there are a few policy recommendations that the US should heed in order to minimize the likelihood that Salafism or other forms of extremism gaining a greater foothold in Tanzania. First, the US must do its utmost to promote further democratization. While apparently an antithesis, it is a fact that pervasive security forces are not necessarily an effective law enforcement and counterterrorism tool. And if a government chooses to rely on a large and oppressive police apparatus, rather than on a more contained and refined one, then it might end up creating those very conditions for terrorism recruiting and diffusion that it originally set out to eliminate. Moreover, the low levels of democracy mean that many groups do not feel they have a viable stake in the democratic system, so that violence may appear a reasonable tactic. Hence, pressing towards greater, consolidated, liberal democracy, while certainly not alleviating all threats of terrorism, should at least decrease its likelihood.<sup>175</sup>

Just as happened in Kenya, professional security forces and a functioning and competent judicial system to process those arrested should be encouraged. Tanzanian police forces have a reputation as corrupt officials who act either for their own benefit or for those of the ruling party, while the judicial system is only now beginning to function after decades of mismanagement. Much remains to be accomplished in the foreseeable future for courts to be considered fair arbiters between the state and its citizenry.<sup>176</sup>

A characteristic —“*in the swamp*” approach will also help. Continued assistance in building up the quality of life for all Africans through support to education (especially quality secular schools), health care, and combating disease decreases the pool of potential recruits to extremist organizations.<sup>177</sup> Continued efforts to end corruption will also augment the state’s capacity and legitimacy,<sup>178</sup> which will in turn send positive feedback to international donors, who today provide approximately 40 percent of the Tanzanian budget.<sup>179</sup>

Politically, the United States should encourage the Tanzanian government to adopt a more federalized system of government, provided that non-CCM political forces are willing to compromise and agree not to seek secession from the greater Tanzanian state. Separating the culturally and religiously unique Zanzibar from Tanganyika (as it was prior to 1964) would appear a reasonable means to minimizing conflict, but in reality, it would undermine Tanzania’s viability as a country. Because the coastal strip of Tanganyika more closely matches Zanzibar than it does the interior of the country, if Zanzibar leaves, chaos and further centrifugal movements would likely ensue in the coastal region (which includes the capital), and could possibly degenerate into yet another violent phase. Moreover, other groups, such as the Chakka clan near Kilimanjaro, might see this as a green light to independence (though there has been no Chakka secessionist movement up to this point). Beyond this, a successful secession in Tanzania could give additional impetus to the myriad of such movements throughout Africa. In short, the secession of Zanzibar is likely to cause more problems than it would solve.

Hence, a federated system that truly allows Zanzibar more autonomy, including the freedom to have a non-CCM leader, would provide a better solution. Along with a similar structure, it is recommended that a version of Truth and Reconciliation committees be established throughout Tanzania so as to document the good and bad of the Nyerere and follow-on eras in the hopes of preventing some charismatic leader from utilizing the unspoken grievances therein. As Tanzania has been relatively stable so far, such pre-emptive action could mitigate the likelihood of future large-spread ethnic or religious conflict.

In short, while counterterrorism will certainly remain a priority in United States relations with the African states of Kenya and Tanzania, mitigating these locales as likely sanctuary for



Islamist extremists and preventing the wide-spread recruitment of locals to such organizations will require a broad policy perspective. Focusing most aid on counterterrorism forces within these countries is largely ineffective if apprehended suspects only end up in a corrupt and near-worthless judiciary system. Moreover, so long as law enforcement forces are corrupt, border protection, coastal patrols, and overall security will remain poor. Additionally, while Salafist groups have received little popular support in the region, political elections considered illegitimate could eventually convince some that violence is the only viable means of political change. Both Kenya and Tanzania have experienced significant political violence, but have also demonstrated an evolving democratic system, albeit from a very low starting point. Hence, as both states make a crucial, stumbling transition towards greater democracy and rule of law, the time is ripe for an overall, comprehensive plan for US aid.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Nehemia Levtzion, "Islam in Africa to 1800," in *The Oxford History of Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>2</sup> J. Spencer Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1964).

<sup>3</sup> Jeffrey Haynes, "Islam and Democracy in East Africa," *Democratization* 13, no. 3 (2006).

<sup>4</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, xi.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 1, Edward A. Alpers, "The Coast and the Development of Caravan Trade," in *A History of Tanzania*, ed. I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu (Nairobi, Kenya: African Publishing House, 1997), 38.

<sup>6</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 6.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 9-10.

<sup>8</sup> Alpers, "Coast and the Development," 38.

<sup>9</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 22-3.

<sup>10</sup> Alpers, "Coast and the Development," 45.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 46. Indeed, the vestiges of this Indian control of capital, especially as Arab plantation owners found themselves more financially indebted to these groups, is one of the reasons today for the poor reputation of Indian members of Tanzanian society even today.

<sup>12</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 23.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 24-5.

<sup>14</sup> Mary Fitzpatrick, *Tanzania*, 3 ed. (Oakland, CA: Lonely Planet, 2005), 19.

<sup>15</sup> G.C.K. Gwassa, "The German Intervention and African Resistance in Tanzania," in *A History of Tanzania*, ed. I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu (Nairobi, Kenya: African Publishing House, 1997), 86.

<sup>16</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 26-7, 44.

<sup>17</sup> Terence O. Ranger, "The Movement of Ideas, 1850-1939," in *A History of Tanzania*, ed. I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu (Nairobi, Kenya: African Publishing House, 1997), 172.

<sup>18</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 28.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 1-2.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>23</sup> Arye Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 161-3. Full-fledged racial segregation often took place. For instance, in the 1930s, Dar Es Salaam was rigidly segregated into zones, with zone I the commercial and administrative center; zone II where Asians lived; and zone III where Africans lived. John Iliffe, "The Age of Improvement and Differentiation," in *A History of Tanzania*, ed. I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu (Nairobi, Kenya: African Publishing House, 1997), 144.

<sup>24</sup> Gwassa, "German Intervention," 90.

- <sup>25</sup> Iliffe, "Age of Improvement," 132. Indeed, the best school in perhaps all of eastern Africa during colonialism was St. Andrew's College at Kiugani in Zanzibar, which was founded by English missionaries. By the 1920s, a large proportion of the best jobs in the British civil service were held by its former pupils, and they also became the core of the future independence movement. ———, "Age of Improvement," 154-5. However, European missionary appeal began to decline during and after World War I, possibly in response to the poor image of Europeans due to the destructiveness of that war, in which Africa was a substantial theater, though missionary education remained strong. Ranger, "Movement of Ideas," 178-9.
- <sup>26</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 171.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 172.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., 28-9.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 166.
- <sup>30</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 63-4.
- <sup>31</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 168-9.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., 80. There are four main schools of Sunni Islam: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali (Wahabism is a sub-set of the Hanbali School). For all but the most learned scholars, what school one belongs to makes little difference. While all schools regard the Koran as an authoritative source of governance, the different schools will put differing emphasis on the importance of hadith (sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohammed), consensus, and individual reasoning. They will also have slight differences in regards to daily and life rituals, such as prayers, funerals, and so forth. Thomas W. Lippman, *Understanding Islam: An Introduction to the Muslim World* (New York, NY: Meridian, 1995), 83-4.
- <sup>33</sup> Lippman, *Understanding Islam*, 147-8.
- <sup>34</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 13.
- <sup>35</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 95-7.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., 81-2. In this paper, "Salafist" will be used to designate groups sometimes referred to as Wahabists, as Salafist is the term these groups call themselves, as well as an increasingly common term by academics and policymakers for such groups.
- <sup>37</sup> The Ahmadiyya movement has since split, with one faction having its headquarters in London, UK and the other in Pakistan.
- <sup>38</sup> "International Religious Freedom Report 2007: Tanzania," U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90124.htm>.
- <sup>39</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 109-11, Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 17-8.
- <sup>40</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 196-7.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid., 178. It should be noted that Indian Shia are not the only group for whom there is much antagonism. For example, the tribe of the Wachagga (sometimes called the Chakka), who live near Mount Kilimanjaro, have been overrepresented in business, transport, tourism and so forth, and are often considered third only to Indians and Arabs in regards to popular disgruntlement towards them. Michael Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, African Studies (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996), 79-80.
- <sup>42</sup> They are called "Sevens" because they believe the line of successions of Imams ended with the 7<sup>th</sup> one, in contrast to the dominant "Twelvers," who believe in the 12<sup>th</sup> Imam and are numerous in Iran and Lebanon. While early Ismailis included such violent groups as the Assassins, today, the Ismailis are peaceful groups. Lippman, *Understanding Islam*, 143-4.
- <sup>43</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 106.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid., 171.
- <sup>45</sup> The very open presence of the Aga Khan Foundation is due to an official Agreements of Cooperation between itself and the Government of Tanzania. It has taken the lead in restoring some of Tanzania's most historic sites, including Stone Town and its cultural center and Forodhani Park in Zanzibar, as well as a chain of hotels throughout the Serengeti regions. The Aga Khan Foundation not only operates in Tanzania, but also in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Canada, India, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mozambique, Pakistan, Portugal, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Uganda, the UK and the US. "The Aga Khan Development Network in Tanzania and Zanzibar," *Aga Khan Development Network* (2008), <http://www.akdn.org/tanzania.asp>.
- <sup>46</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 14-5.
- <sup>47</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 169.
- <sup>48</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 140-1.
- <sup>49</sup> Fitzpatrick, *Tanzania*, 21.
- <sup>50</sup> Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 36-8.

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- <sup>51</sup> Fitzpatrick, *Tanzania*, 20.
- <sup>52</sup> Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 96-7.
- <sup>53</sup> Lionel Cliffe, "From Independence to Self-Reliance," in *A History of Tanzania*, ed. I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu (Nairobi, Kenya: African Publishing House, 1997), 252.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid., 249.
- <sup>55</sup> Fitzpatrick, *Tanzania*, 20.
- <sup>56</sup> Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 40-1.
- <sup>57</sup> Paul S. Adams, "Corporatism and Comparative Politics: Is There a New Century of Corporatism," in *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, ed. Howard J. Wiarda (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 32-3.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid., 19-27. The term "corporatism" is also associated with economies in Europe where governments and trade unions cooperate in order to create labor, wage, and tax policies. This version is sometimes referred to as "societal corporatism." However, this article only focuses on the state corporatism version often exhibited in socialist countries, where, rather than mere cooperation with governments, all interest groups are co-opted into the government. For state versus societal corporatism, see Adams, "Corporatism and Comparative Politics," 30.
- <sup>59</sup> The results of these programs and other socialist economic experiments was that per capita income fell, agricultural production stagnated and industrial output was only 50% of capacity. Other external factors that contributed to these economic difficulties were the high price of petroleum and the fall in export prices of coffee and sisal, two main Tanzanian exports. Fitzpatrick, *Tanzania*, 22. In discussions by one of the authors, some Tanzanians claimed that, in these villagization schemes, to prevent the population from returning to their home villages, those home villages were often burned. Others have claimed that urban residents were sent to rural areas to work on plantations, with dubious results at best. These facts cannot be independently verified.
- <sup>60</sup> Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 11-3.
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid., 20-3.
- <sup>62</sup> Okema remarks that many protested such lack of electoral choices by either failing to register or by "spoiling" the vote. He asserts that the number of actual "spoiled" votes was always under 50%. His claims cannot be verified by these authors. However, if true, they indicate that the Tanzanian national myth of the overwhelming popularity of Nyerere as the father of the country may be just that—a myth. Ibid., 126-32.
- <sup>63</sup> A cell were the members of TANU/CCM within a group of 10 houses. Cliffe, "From Independence to Self-Reliance," 250.
- <sup>64</sup> Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 17-8.
- <sup>65</sup> Fitzpatrick, *Tanzania*, 22. Corruption became particularly problematic after the country engaged in some economic liberation beginning in 1984 as a condition for receiving International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. Since then, a few have been able to become relatively wealthy. Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 43, 65-6. In 2007, Tanzania was ranked 94<sup>th</sup> out of 179 in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. J. Graf Lambsdorff, "Corruption Perceptions Index," Transparency International, [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2007](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007).
- <sup>66</sup> Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 26-8. It should be noted that during a Spring 2008 visit to Tanzania by one of the authors, informal interviews with Tanzanians and expatriates confirmed this belief that the state security apparatus had remained intact and that it acted on behalf of the ruling CCM.
- <sup>67</sup> Arthur Banks, William Overstreet, and Thomas Muller, *Political Handbook of the World: 2000-2002* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 2004).
- <sup>68</sup> "Background Note: Kenya," (June 2008), <http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/ke/>.
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>70</sup> Banks, Overstreet, and Muller, *Political Handbook*.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>72</sup> "Background Note: Kenya."
- <sup>73</sup> ———, *Political Handbook*.
- <sup>74</sup> Kristin Bremer and John Riley, "Kenyan Society, Women's Rights, and Kenyan Democracy: Are They Compatible?," (Chicago: Midwest Political Science Association, 2008).
- <sup>75</sup> "Kenya: When Imploding Is Not Enough," *Economist* (September 4, 2008), [http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displayStory.cfm?story\\_id=12059310](http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12059310).

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- <sup>76</sup> The smaller number has been repeatedly cited in *The Economist*. However, the US State Department cites approximately 600,000 internally displaced or refugees. Ibid, "Background Note: Kenya."
- <sup>77</sup> Haynes, "Islam and Democracy in East Africa," 491-2.
- <sup>78</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 21.
- <sup>79</sup> Haynes, "Islam and Democracy in East Africa," 492.
- <sup>80</sup> Francois Constantin, "Muslims and Politics: The Attempt to Create Muslim National Organizations in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya," in *Religion and Politics in East Africa: The Period since Independence*, ed. Høger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (London, UK: James Currey, 1995), 25.
- <sup>81</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 164.
- <sup>82</sup> Haynes, "Islam and Democracy in East Africa," 494, "Tanzania," *C.I.A. World Factbook* (2008), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html>. Christians are especially concentrated in the southwest and north-central portions of the country.
- <sup>83</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 170-1.
- <sup>84</sup> Many aspects of society, and not just education, were placed on a quota system. Nevertheless, Nyerere's emphasis on nationalism and the use of Swahili as a national language has meant that Tanzania has not suffered violent tribalism anywhere near to the extent of its neighbors such as Uganda, Kenya or Rwanda. Indeed, Tanzania has been perhaps the most peaceful country in eastern Africa since independence. Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 81-2.
- <sup>85</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 25-6. Interestingly, the current Vice President of Tanzania, Dr. Ali Mohamed Shein, is also Muslim, bringing into question whether the Presidency will continue to alternate between Christian and Muslim.
- <sup>86</sup> Constantin, "Muslims and Politics," 28.
- <sup>87</sup> Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 88, 112-3.
- <sup>88</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 165.
- <sup>89</sup> Haynes, "Islam and Democracy in East Africa," 495.
- <sup>90</sup> Constantin, "Muslims and Politics," 21-3.
- <sup>91</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 171.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid., 89.
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid., 22-4.
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid., 24-6.
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid., 41.
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid., 21-2.
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid., 49-54.
- <sup>98</sup> Ibid., 135-62.
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid., 153-5.
- <sup>100</sup> "International Religious Freedom Report 2005: Kenya," U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51478.htm>.
- <sup>101</sup> ———, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 111-20.
- <sup>102</sup> "International Religious Freedom Report 2005: Kenya."
- <sup>103</sup> ———, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 9-12.
- <sup>104</sup> Ibid., 140-7.
- <sup>105</sup> Ibid., 29-31.
- <sup>106</sup> Bremer and Riley, "Kenyan Society, Women's Rights, and Kenyan Democracy: Are They Compatible?."
- <sup>107</sup> "B.B.C. World Service Poll: World View of U.S. Role Goes from Bad to Worse," *BBC World Service* (January 23, 2007), [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23\\_01\\_07\\_us\\_poll.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23_01_07_us_poll.pdf).
- <sup>108</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>109</sup> This is not to imply that Islamic extremism has not planted roots anywhere in Africa, such as the examples of Sudan, northern Nigeria and some sects in North Africa attest. This paper only argues that it has been relatively rare in Kenya and Tanzania.
- <sup>110</sup> William Rosenau, "Al Qaida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 1 (2005): 2.
- <sup>111</sup> Ibid.: 4.
- <sup>112</sup> Haynes, "Islam and Democracy in East Africa," 491.
- <sup>113</sup> Ibid.: 504.

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- <sup>114</sup> Rosenau, "Al Qaida Recruitment Trends," 1.
- <sup>115</sup> Peter. L Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 108-9.
- <sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 108-12.
- <sup>117</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 83.
- <sup>118</sup> Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.*, 113-5.
- <sup>119</sup> Jessica Piombo, "Terrorist Financing and Government Responses in East Africa," in *Terrorism Financing and State Responses*, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 193.
- <sup>120</sup> Rosenau, "Al Qaida Recruitment Trends," 3. It is unclear how many Kenyans were actually involved in this plot. In 2005, four Kenyans of seven arrested had their charges thrown out because the judge claimed the prosecution's case was too weak, and because confessions were obtained through torture. "Mombasa Bombing Trial Collapses," *BBC* (June 9, 2005), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4075988.stm>.
- <sup>121</sup> Piombo, "Terrorist Financing," 187.
- <sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 192-3.
- <sup>123</sup> Ranger, "Movement of Ideas," 178.
- <sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 184.
- <sup>125</sup> Haynes, "Islam and Democracy in East Africa," 495.
- <sup>126</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 167, Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 8.
- <sup>127</sup> Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 68-70.
- <sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, 152-3.
- <sup>129</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 168.
- <sup>130</sup> Haynes, "Islam and Democracy in East Africa," 495.
- <sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*: 496.
- <sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*: 496-7, "Two Die in Muslim Riot in Tanzania," *BBC News* (February 14, 2002), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1818854.stm>.
- <sup>134</sup> Arab groups can be divided into 4 sub-groups: Shirihiri traders originally from the Hadhrami (Yemeni) coast; Omani Arabs who came with the Omani Sultanate; Arabs who predated the arrival of the Portuguese; and those of mixed Arab-African blood who were not entirely accepted either group. Johannes Mosare, "Background to the Revolution in Zanzibar," in *A History of Tanzania*, ed. I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu (Nairobi, Kenya: African Publishing House, 1997), 224.
- <sup>135</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 166. The Africans were mainly the descendents of freed slaves still living on Zanzibar. While most authors argue that the Zanzibar islands and the coastal strip have generally developed separately from the rest of Tanganyika, Kimambo and Temu argue, in contrast, that there were close ties between these two regions in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, which in turn led to close ties between the revolutionary socialist parties at the time of independence: the ASP and TANU. Alpers, "Coast and the Development," 35.
- <sup>136</sup> Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 167-8, Fitzpatrick, *Tanzania*, 20.
- <sup>137</sup> Personal discussions by one of the authors with Asian and African Tanzanian citizens (many of these citizens now lived on the mainland) in Spring 2008 confirmed massacres, roadblocks, citizens having their passports taken from them, and even "forced marriages" between political leaders and local women. Unverified reports indicate as much as half of the Arab population of Zanzibar was killed or fled.
- <sup>138</sup> Fitzpatrick, *Tanzania*, 20. Though the two countries did not combine until 1964, the pro-CCM chapter by Cliffe points out that police from Tanganyika were sent to assist in the maintenance of law and order within days of the revolution." Cliffe, "From Independence to Self-Reliance," 249. Not surprisingly, no referendum was held, so there is no statistical data to indicate what percentage of Zanzibaris would have chosen to unite within a Tanzanian state. However, given prior election results, it is likely the island was split at least 50-50. As a result of this union, the Tanzanian government is of two parts—an overall Tanzanian government, and one for Zanzibar, which remains under an umbrella of the larger state. There have been some attempts by mainlanders to have a separate Tanganyikan government on par with that of Zanzibar, with an overarching Tanzanian state above both, but this was vetoed by the Tanzanian government for reasons unknown. Okema, *Political Culture in Tanzania*, 153-4.
- <sup>139</sup> Fitzpatrick, *Tanzania*, 20.
- <sup>140</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 169.

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- <sup>141</sup> Ibid., 166, Haynes, "Islam and Democracy in East Africa," 496.
- <sup>142</sup> "Tanzania Presidential, National Assembly and Local Government Elections, 14 December 2005," E.I.S.A. Election Observer Mission, <http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/tzomr2005.pdf>.
- <sup>143</sup> The elections held on the mainland were also deemed to be chaotic." The CCM's Benjamin Mkapa won with 62% of the vote. In the 2000 elections, things went smoothly on the mainland, and Mkapa was elected again. Fitzpatrick, *Tanzania*, 22.
- <sup>144</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 170.
- <sup>145</sup> "Tanzania: Zanzibar Election Massacres Documented," Human Rights Watch, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/04/10/tanzan3838.htm>.
- <sup>146</sup> Fitzpatrick, *Tanzania*, 22, "Tanzania Presidential, National Assembly and Local Government Elections, 14 December 2005."
- <sup>147</sup> Elections were postponed two months due to the death of the vice president of the Chama ChaDemokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema) party. The mainland elections were considered to be better run than past election campaigns, though there were allegations that opposition rallies had a tendency to be tear gassed and that there was some voter intimidation. "Tanzania Presidential, National Assembly and Local Government Elections, 14 December 2005."
- <sup>148</sup> "The Elections in Zanzibar, United Republic of Tanzania: The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group," Commonwealth Secretariat, [http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared\\_asp\\_files/uploadedfiles/903C0A27-DA0B-4AF1-8361-0F512980FB0A\\_COGElectionsZanzibar2005.pdf](http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/903C0A27-DA0B-4AF1-8361-0F512980FB0A_COGElectionsZanzibar2005.pdf).
- <sup>149</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>150</sup> Haynes, "Islam and Democracy in East Africa," 497.
- <sup>151</sup> Ibid.: 496.
- <sup>152</sup> Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya*, 81.
- <sup>153</sup> Ibid., 57-8.
- <sup>154</sup> Haynes, "Islam and Democracy in East Africa.", Rosenau, "Al Qaida Recruitment Trends."
- <sup>155</sup> "Kenya: Muslim Group Wants Police to Free Terror Suspects," *AfricaNews: The Nation* (November 28, 2007).
- <sup>156</sup> "Kenya: M.P.S to Visit Somalia to Query Deportees," *AfricaNews: The East African Standard* (March 19, 2007).
- <sup>157</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>158</sup> Beth Elise Whitaker, "Reluctant Partners: Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Democracy in Kenya," *International Studies Perspectives* 9 (2008): 257.
- <sup>159</sup> Ibid.: 260.
- <sup>160</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>161</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>162</sup> Ibid.: 261.
- <sup>163</sup> "Islam Has Tamed a Lawless Somalia, but Is It Raising an African Taliban?," *Sunday Telegraph (London)* (October 8, 2006).
- <sup>164</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>165</sup> "Somalia: Unease as Islamists Take Over," *AfricaNews: The East Africa Standard* (October 1, 2006).
- <sup>166</sup> James Gordon Meeks, "Us Targets Al Qaeda Bids in Somalia," *Daily News* (January 10, 2007).
- <sup>167</sup> "Somalia: Hunger and Terror," *Economist* (September 4, 2008), [https://www.economist.com/background/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=12059342](https://www.economist.com/background/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12059342).
- <sup>168</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>169</sup> "Ethiopia Begins Somalia Pullout," B.B.C. News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7808495.stm>.
- <sup>170</sup> Pierre Thomas and Jason Ryan, "Feds Probing Possible Minnesota Terror Group," A.B.C. News, <http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Story?id=6331697&page=1>.
- <sup>171</sup> Piombo, "Terrorist Financing," 196-9.
- <sup>172</sup> Ibid., 199-200.
- <sup>173</sup> Jessica Piombo, "Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview," *Strategic Insights* VI, no. 1 (January 2008), <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Jan/piomboJan07.asp>.
- <sup>174</sup> "Somalia: Hunger and Terror."
- <sup>175</sup> Rosenau, "Al Qaida Recruitment Trends," 6-7.

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<sup>176</sup> "Not Fair, Not Fair," *Economist* (April 12, 2001),  
[http://www.economist.com/books/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story\\_id=568882](http://www.economist.com/books/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=568882).

<sup>177</sup> David Dickson, "Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda," (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute for Peace, 2005), 6.

<sup>178</sup> In February 2008, the Tanzanian state sacked three ministers (all of the CCM members) on corruption charges, which President Kikwete claims was an effort to clean up corruption. As a mark of trust in the administration, Britain now gives its donations directly to the Tanzanian government. "A Struggle for Power," *Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire* (February 11, 2008),  
[http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story\\_id=10676185](http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=10676185), "President Kikwete's Hard Road Ahead," *Economist* (August 30, 2007),  
[http://www.economist.com/world/africa/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story\\_id=9725792](http://www.economist.com/world/africa/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=9725792).

<sup>179</sup> "A Struggle for Power."